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A 'debutante discipline'
It is no secret that international relations found a place in the universities as a result of the carnage of the first world war and of the beneficence of a small number of businessmen. Academics were appointed to devote themselves to what seemed a self-evidently serious and disturbing problem. This problem and its study were then transformed into a distinct subject of university instruction.
Unfortunately, such alchemy has become all too familiar in our universities. A problem, industrial disturbances say, attracts widespread attention; important authorities deem it worthy of, and amenable to, disinterested study; academics are appointed for this purpose; almost instantly the problem becomes a subject which soon begins to fill large tracts of the teaching timetable; and, inevitably, students so deluded as to devote themselves exclusively to industrial relations, or some such horror, are duly proclaimed to have obtained a university education thereby. The fallacy is obvious. Problems, however pressing, do not as such make university subjects. Professor Manning seems to have succumbed completely to the fallacy in question in his attempt to create, ab initio, an autonomous new subject, which he variously designated 'meta-diplomatics' and 'social cosmology'. For his new subject Manning claimed the standing of a 'debutante discipline'.2 As an example of this discipline I offer an almost random Manning quotation:
In the eyes of formal diplomatic theory what occurs internationally happens as among the members of a 'social' category, the category of sovereign states. And, for seeing what so happens as happening simply so, a certain sort of lenses may be worn. In the sight on the other hand of the social analysis which looks behind the formulas in force to the forces in operation, the picture is less clear-cut. And, for seeing just how other than clear-cut, the need is for another sort of lens. Or, to revert to the earlier metaphor, another shape of thinking-cap. With our study of diplomatic theory we cannot think to dispense. For that theory provides the formal framework within which the world-wide play and cross-play and counter-play of social energies works itself out. But, for the sources of these energies, it is necessary to look, and this through different lenses, elsewhere. there could be no open society, no associations of any worth, and our individuality would be severely truncated. This is why the distinctions between society and state, and state and sovereign, are of such fundamental importance and this is why liberal political thought is humane, its commitment to human individuality being intrinsic to these basic classifications. By scientific I take the English school really to mean nothing more than objective, clinical, cool: terms which describe an attitude, not a subject or a method. Let us accept this usage. Now an objective science of society in the English sense is only possible in certain conditions. For example, the scientific enquirer must believe, and those in a position to regulate his activities must also believe, that a society exists which does not determine what is thought about it. There must also exist conditions in which any question about social relations may be asked. And it must be possible for conclusions about the nature of social relations to be placed in individually chosen systematic form, published, and then
